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Micro Factory Retailing; an 
Alternative, More Sustainable 
Automotive Business Model. 
In 2000 we launched a new alternative 
automotive business model, Micro Factory 
Retailing (MFR), which, although still 
marginal, has nevertheless already 
inspired a number of automotive 
businesses. MFR is based on networks of 
small dispersed, combined assembly, retail 
and aftercare or lifetime management (e.g. 
maintenance and repair, parts supply, 
upgrade, vehicle management and 
takeback) facilities that could operate car 
use under a product-service system (PSS), 
whereby ownership is retained by the 
company and users pay for their use. 
Approximately 20 years on from when the 
first germs of this innovative idea were 
sown is a good time to revisit the concept 
and its subsequent fortunes. This paper 
traces through the early history of ideas 
and developments for MFR; to its current 
situation and practice. Sustainability is a 
major aspect of MFR. I present this work 
on the car and innovations from my 
experiences and growth in understanding.  
Background on “Selling” the Micro-
factory retailing business model 
Our approach is unlike that of most 
business academics in that we are 
primarily sector specialists, rather than 
discipline-based, or even discipline-
focussed. The sector covers a range of 
activities and disciplines, from 
engineering, design, marketing, human 
resource management, supply chain 
management, to politics and legislation. 
This approach has also been evident from 
our methodology in that we maintain a 
continuous dialogue and exchange of ideas 
with the automotive industry and those 
who regulate it (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 
2017).  
Unfortunately, we have often found the 
business academic literature is somewhat 
out of touch with the latest developments 
in the automotive sector. The academic 
literature on the sector appears more like 
historical accounts than current account; 
or able to contemplate alternative 
business models. In view of this situation, 
we found academic publishers and 
reviewers initially quite unreceptive to 
these ideas and decided to air them first to 
business and practitioner audiences. This 
took the form both of publications (Wells 
and Nieuwenhuis, 2000) as well as 
conference papers to industry audiences. 
These ideas were invariably well received, 
although they did lead to many debates.  
MFR was a difficult sell, since examples and 
precedents did not exist, which of course 
are thin for most alternative business 
models. Similarly we were often asked, if 
these ideas are so good, then why do Ford 
and General Motors not adopt them. 
Again, the answer is obvious, as these 
ideas run precisely counter to and in fact 
challenge and undermine their existing 
business models. We decided, therefore, 
to use academic conferences (e.g. 
Nieuwenhuis 2002) and an academic book 
as first steps in broadening the appeal of 
this alternative business model 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003), with 
academic journal articles emerging much 
later (e.g. Wells and Orsato, 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis and Katsifou, 2015). 
Origins – initial ideas 
In 1996 I bought a new mountainbike and 
it occurred to me that here was a very 
interesting business model. The company 
whose name appeared on the frame – in 
this case Proflex – actually made very little 
of this bike. Although the design was 
theirs, as was the development work 
behind the springs for their unique Girvin 
full suspension system, most of the rest 
came from named suppliers. Suppliers 
whose name remained on the product, 
such as Mavic for the rims and Shimano for 
the gears. The bike itself was built in 
Taiwan by a subcontractor. Due to its 
modularity, the bike could be upgraded in 
various areas and in due course featured a 
Selle Italia saddle, for example. In the 
automotive industry – which is our 
specialism – examples of this kind of work 
were very limited. You might see the name 
of a design house – e.g. Pininfarina, Zagato 
– on a car, or even ‘Handling by Lotus’ on 
an Isuzu, and occasionally the name of a 
tuning firm such as Alpina or AMG, but 
beyond this, the final assembler’s name, 
BMW, Mercedes-Benz, or Ford was 
dominant. 
At this time, we were struggling to 
understand mass car production and 
traced this right back to its origins in the 
early 20th century. This review process 
involved extensive archival research in 
Europe and the US. It had struck us that 
mass production was a barrier to 
sustainability in cars due to the sheer 
number of cars added to the planet’s roads 
each year. We were exploring possible 
alternative automotive business models, 
focussing in the first instance on 
appropriate manufacturing systems.  
This bike was a manufacturing system and 
business model that combined a degree of 
mass production of standardised 
components that was then shared by a 
number of competitors. The bike firms still 
retained their brand integrity and brand 
awareness in the market despite doing 
very little themselves. This vertically 
disintegrated industry still managed to 
show significant diversity and 
differentiation in the market, despite this 
business model. Could this approach be 
applied to automobiles?  
Environmental challenges to mass 
production 
While many in the environmental 
community – including academics – 
advocated an abandoning of the car as the 
only way forward on our quest for greater 
sustainability, we felt this was a non-
starter.  
If people were going to persist in their 
pursuit of automobility, how could this be 
delivered in the most sustainable manner? 
This was the era of Amory Lovins 
‘Hypercar’ concept (Lovins 1995; Von 
Weizsacker, et al. 1998); other initiatives 
such as the Clinton-Gore administration’s 
Partnership for a New Generation of 
Vehicles (PNGV) also existed. It was an era 
of much experimentation, including new 
materials, which necessitated new 
manufacturing techniques. GM’s EV-1 
electric sportscar, for example prompted 
the creation of a completely new 
manufacturing system, the Lansing Craft 
Center, while mainstream car production 
was also increasingly homing in on lower 
volume manufacturing approaches (see 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 1997). 
However, it occurred to us that the existing 
‘fire-and-forget’ mass production system 
also missed other tricks. Considering the 
lifetime income stream of a car, the actual 
mass producers only managed to capture a 
relatively small slice of revenue (Figure 1). 
Moving towards a new business model 
that, instead of generating income only 
from selling cars, parts and finance, made 
money by capturing a much greater 
proportion of that lifetime value stream. 
This holistic capturing of value seemed to 
make a lot more sense, while at the same 
time easing that pressure to ‘move the 
metal’, which made the existing business 
model inherently unsustainable. 
Figure 1 
This new business would involve an 
integration of manufacturing and retailing 
in a manner that did exist in the early years 
of the industry. It was essentially made 
obsolete by the move to mass production, 
with its high levels of investment, 
particularly in Budd-style all steel body 
technology (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2007) 
and its attendant economies of scale. This 
situation forced the industry into 
centralising manufacturing and separating 
manufacturing from retail and distribution. 
We were again looking at the core 
technology of car making – the Budd all-
steel body – as the principal barrier to a 
new business model. 
Budd’s all-steel body 
Cars started life as craft-made products in 
that they were made one-by-one manually 
with each vehicle being different, and each 
component being unique, as it was 
adapted to its neighbours in the 
subassembly. This method has often been 
described as the ‘European System’. Very 
rapidly, major suppliers were set up, 
particularly in France, able to supply 
engines, gearboxes, axles and other key 
components, allowing standardisation 
(Jeal, 2012). This process also allowed the 
number of brands to mushroom in the 
early years of the 20th century.  
The key building blocks of cars were now 
readily available to all. Many firms 
assembled cars from bought in 
components and limited themselves to 
adding their own name. The modular 
construction of cars at this time made this 
possible. This approach was used by Ford 
to develop its Model T.  
The mass car production of today is very 
different from the way the Ford Model T 
was built at Highland Park, Michigan. The 
Model T, was based on a modular 
approach to car making as used by the 
previous generation of craft builders: 
separate chassis and separate, wood-
framed, coach-built, or ‘composite’ body. 
Modern mass produced cars are made 
quite differently. They use all-steel 
‘monocoque’, or ‘unibody’ construction, 
whereby a structural metal box fulfils the 
functions of both body and chassis. This 
technology was made possible by Budd 
and Ledwinka’s invention, around 1912, of 
the all-steel welded body and the press 
and jig technology that came with it. Thus, 
modern mass car manufacturing in many 
ways owes at least as much to Edward 
Budd and Joe Ledwinka, as to Henry Ford 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2007, 
Nieuwenhuis, 2014).  
Budd’s steel body technology requires very 
high initial investments. But once these 
initial investments are made, low unit costs 
at high volume production occur – each car 
made is cheaper than under the previous 
craft-based system. This idea is the basic 
economy-of-scale paradigm where a 
sufficient number of cars is made to recoup 
that very high initial investment.  
Budd’s innovations therefore constitute 
the basis for the economics of car making, 
notably its economies of scale 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003, 2007). The 
main change being from the manufacture 
of modular cars from largely in-house 
components at Ford’s Highland Park plant, 
to the manufacture of steel bodies, 
assembled into cars from largely 
outsourced components and sub-
assemblies in a typical modern mass 
production car plant.  
If we consider how cars are made today 
and the investments required to make 
them, it is clear that the largest areas of 
investment are in developing and making 
internal combustion engines, and in 
making and painting bodies. It is the latter 
more than the former that allows the 
differentiation of cars in the market.  
When we think of a car factory, we have in 
mind an assembly plant. A car assembly 
plant’s primary activity is the making and 
painting of car bodies and then assembling 
these into finished cars by using largely 
bought-in components. Many of the parts 
Ford spent so much effort into making 
more efficiently are today sourced from 
suppliers. Modern car manufacturers 
outsource some 60% to 80% of the value of 
their cars. Hence a modern car assembly 
plant is typically subdivided into the 
following processes, which, combined with 
internal combustion engines, the industry 
regards as its core activities: 
1) Press shop – where the sheet steel is 
pressed into panels. 
2) Body shop or Body-in-white – where 
these panels are welded together to 
form bodies. 
3) Paint shop – where these steel bodies 
are painted. 
4) Pre-assembly – where wiring and 
piping and other components are fitted 
to the body, culminating in ‘the 
marriage’ where the powertrain is 
mated with the ‘unibody’. 
5) Trim or Final assembly – after fitting 
the powertrain (engine + transmission) 
the car can be put on its wheels and 
finished inside and out. 
The principal investments in an assembly 
plant involve the first three processes – the 
making and painting of steel bodies. As 
bodies tend to change far more often than 
castings or powertrain components, these 
body-related investments have to be 
repeated regularly, with those elements 
not replaced, at least reconfigured, 
reprogrammed and updated. These 
investments are such and the resulting 
breakeven points so fundamental to the 
business of mass car production that these 
‘Buddist’ investments, combined with 
investments in powertrain (engine and 
transmission) now determine the 
economics of car making.  
The 1920s and 1930s were the key phase 
for the roll-out of this technology. By 1925, 
Budd all steel technology already had a 
50% share of US body production 
(Courtenay, 1987: 22). This share was 
largely due to the fact that in 1925 Ford 
adopted Budd all-steel technology at its 
new River Rouge facility, having earlier 
outsourced all its bodies due to its inability 
to mass produce them (Post, 1961). 
With Ford’s and Budd’s innovations, mass 
car production was possible and the final 
element involved the means to create a 
mass car market. This was the contribution 
of General Motors (GM), which introduced 
large-scale vehicle finance through its 
foundation in 1919 of the General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation. During the 1920s 
GM also introduced the trade-in as a down 
payment on a new car and the 
manufacturer and dealer-run used car 
business. In addition to these innovations, 
GM developed the concept of a product 
range, allowing customers to gradually 
trade up from a Chevrolet, via Oakland 
(later Pontiac), Buick, Oldsmobile, La Salle, 
to Cadillac. In addition, it focussed much 
more on styling, colour – enhanced by 
Dupont’s majority shareholding in GM – 
and appearance and it promoted the idea 
of planned obsolescence through the 
annual model change (Flink, 1988).  
The next step was the phasing out of the 
separate body and chassis; as both were 
now made of steel, they could be welded 
together into a light and stiff box-like 
structure, the ‘monocoque’ or ‘unibody’. 
While it brought the need for greater 
accuracy as well as the problem of 
assembling the car after the unibody was 
built – which requires greater care on the 
part of assembly workers to avoid damage 
to the painted body – its advantages in 
terms of weight, structural integrity and 
manufacturability were such that today 
nearly all mass produced cars are made in 
this fashion (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 
2003). Because of the exceptionally high 
capital investments involved, it forced the 
industry into a production-led business 
model whereby the entire model came to 
be driven by the needs of the 
manufacturing system.  
Toyota’s ‘lean’ production merely refined 
this model by re-integrating it more closely 
with the market, but it is still not truly 
demand-driven. Plants have to produce at 
levels sufficient to reach the economies of 
scale inherent in these high capital 
investments, whatever the demand for 
their products. 
Alternative Automotive Production 
Models 
Sabel and Zeitlin (1985, 1997) have pointed 
out that mass production was not an 
inevitable outcome of developments in the 
early 20th century. Alternatives were and 
could have been equally viable. Eighty 
years or so on, one option seemed to be 
abandoning the all-steel body by revisiting 
some of these alternatives and possibly 
adopting different car manufacturing 
technologies. These new technologies 
were normally reserved for low volume, 
high end cars such as Ferrari, Aston Martin, 
Rolls-Royce, as well as heavy trucks and 
buses. Combining this characteristic with 
more of the retail, distribution and 
aftermarket activities, appeared to be 
more profitable.  
The advantages are several. First of all, the 
abandoning of Budd all-steel body 
technology avoids the very high 
investments in capital equipment needed 
for this (press shop, press tools, body-in-
white, paint). Although this step meant 
abandoning high volume production, it 
does allow for a dispersed network of local 
assembly facilities. This network could be 
rooted in local communities, cater for local 
tastes and needs, but could benefit from 
economies of scale in components and 
subassemblies such as powertrain that 
could be shared by a number of notionally 
competing manufacturers.  This idea is 
much like the mountainbike model. 
Ironically, Ford used a not dissimilar model 
for the Model T, which – consisting as it did 
of a set of mechanical components, but no 
body – was often shipped to local markets 
as a kit for local assembly and for locally-
made bodies to be fitted. 
The term Micro Factory Retailing (MFR) 
was coined for this new model. This 
seemed like an apropos term and the term 
has stuck. We then began to refine and 
nuance the business model. We found that 
some low volume manufacturers already 
used elements of the new model.  
In this context our UK base was helpful, as 
firms like Morgan Motor Company and 
Lotus are of particular interest. Contrary to 
popular belief, their products – despite 
being built in much lower numbers – are no 
more expensive than their mass produced 
or volume produced competitors. In 
essence, they have offset high capital 
investment against higher investment in 
skilled labour. The only penalty is an 
inability to produce at higher volumes, but 
also the absence of any need to produce in 
high volumes to recoup their investment 
costs. Here lay the core of a new business 
model. 
Micro Factory Retailing 
The Morgan Motor Company business 
model relies on making low volumes of 
durable cars tailored to the requirements 
of individual customers (Nieuwenhuis and 
Katsifou, 2015). In a world increasingly in 
need of sustainable consumption and 
production, this business model resonates. 
This resonance exists, despite the fact that 
Morgan’s business model dates back a 
hundred years.  
About 60-70 million cars are produced 
worldwide each year, a practice that is 
clearly unsustainable. In the longer term, if 
car making is to survive, then all car 
manufacturers will have to move towards 
a business model closer to that of low 
volume manufacturers. Lower volumes 
would be produced, but the business 
would survive by helping keep the cars on 
the road after the initial sale, extending the 
life of the automobile.  
Morgan produces fewer than 1500 cars a 
year. Morgan can be regarded as using a 
partial version of Micro Factory Retailing, 
or MFR (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003, 2009). The 
MFR business model offers a number of 
key advantages over Ford-Budd style mass 
production. These advantages make it 
inherently more sustainable in economic, 
social and environmental terms. Some of 
the main reasons and MFR characteristic 
for these advantages include:  
• Investments in productive capacity – a 
micro factory would typically have a 
capacity of around 5,000 units a year – are 
incremental, expandable in line with 
market demand. Surplus demand is 
managed through waiting lists – a process 
used by Morgan. This situation also 
ensures continuity of both production and 
employment.  
• The incremental expansion of capacity 
means that new plants can be added to 
develop new markets, while new products 
or variants can be introduced 
incrementally, resulting in risk reduction.  
• Customers can be shown around the plant 
and meet the people who make their car, 
and can thereby feel ‘closer’ to the 
product. This has long been a feature of 
the Morgan approach, and is even used by 
more mainstream volume car makers 
trying to build brand loyalty: including 
Mercedes-Benz, VW, Porsche, and BMW. 
• The factory becomes the location for 
repair, spare parts, upgrading, restoration 
and modification. This allows the 
manufacturer to tap into the elusive but 
potentially very profitable aftermarket 
revenue stream, while allowing the car to 
‘grow’ with its owner thereby enhancing 
retention and vehicle lifespans for greater 
sustainability. 
• The factory can undergo a transition over 
time from an essentially new car 
production focus, to one more involved in 
service and repair. Thus, the factory does 
not depend solely on the sale of new cars. 
Bristol Cars has exploited this model well 
(Parsons, 2002; Balfour, 2009). 
• The inherent flexibility of small-scale 
manufacturing provides better customer 
care, as well as shorter lead times, and late 
configuration.  
• The model builds stronger worker 
commitment to the product and to 
customers. This results in more satisfying 
work for staff, and better quality levels 
with all the benefits this entails. It also 
builds higher skill levels in local 
communities. 
• This manufacturing approach can take 
advantage of local small scale suppliers 
adding content appreciated by local 
markets. At the same time, modular supply 
strategies combined with commodity or 
off-the-shelf purchasing can reduce cost 
and achieve economies of scale where 
these are most appropriate, such as in 
powertrain – with the advent of electronic 
vehicles, increasingly: batteries, 
controllers and electric traction motors.  
• Modular construction allows quick and 
easy product up-grades. Thus, 
technologies that meet the latest 
environmental and safety standards can 
often be retrofitted – a major area of 
obsolescence in the current system – while 
the vehicle can also be tailored to changing 
customer needs and wants. 
• Small scale manufacturing processes have 
a lower environmental impact compared 
with traditional high-volume 
manufacturing (Schumacher 1973). Lower 
site impact: a modern car plant occupies 
several square kilometres of land. 
Compared with this, Morgan operates 
from a classic ‘light industrial’ facility. 
MFR facilities meet social and political 
objectives by creating local employment in 
high-value manufacturing activities. At a 
time when mass production jobs are being 
globalised, the MFR approach makes a key 
contribution in retaining those skills and 
adding value within the local market. The 
MFR facility does not necessarily sell the 
car, but would be equally viable as 
manager of a product-service system, 
whereby it would own the car and sell a 
mobility service to the user under a 
leasing-style arrangement.  
Impact of MFR 
Even at an early industrial development 
stage this alternative business model 
seems to have gained interest. After 
presenting these ideas at industry events 
and publishing in practitioner journals, 
businesses, potential start-ups and existing 
low volume manufacturers approached us 
with a keen interest in the MFR model.  
Using our established methodology (Wells 
and Nieuwenhuis, 2017) we ended up 
working on an iterative basis with a 
number of firms, with varying degrees of 
contact and regularity of meetings. These 
firms include Morgan Motor Co., Gordon 
Murray Design – whose ‘i-Stream’ 
manufacturing model was inspired by 
MFR, Welsh hydrogen car developer 
Riversimple and American open-source car 
design company Local Motors. All of these 
organizations could envision the MFR 
model benefits from multiple perspectives 
and reasons. They adapted and adopted 
elements of MFR, or used our work to 
justify their existing business model.  
The justification of their existing business 
was particularly the case for UK low 
volume specialist producers who often 
struggled to convince potential investors – 
more used to the economics of mass 
production car companies – that their 
business model was viable. Riversimple is 
advocating a product-service system (PSS) 
approach as part of its business model. 
They have enhanced the MFR concept by 
adding a novel governance approach that 
includes a body of 6 ‘custodians’ who 
represent different stakeholders, such as 
the Environment, Customers, the local 
community, staff investors and 
commercial partners/suppliers. These act 
as an independent body guiding the 
business. Riversimple argues this allows 
them to ‘see in all directions’ (Riversimple, 
2017).  
Local Motors has enhanced the model by 
recruiting potential buyers as product 
developers on an open-source design 
basis. It has also pioneered the use of 
additive manufacturing in this context and 
has in fact adopted the term 
‘microfactories’ for their dispersed 
network of facilities 
(https://localmotors.com/microfactories/)
. Such contact with industry has allowed us 
to refine at least aspects of the model over 
the intervening years (e.g. Wells and 
Orsato, Wells, 2013, Nieuwenhuis 2014, 
Nieuwenhuis and Katsifou, 2015). 
Responses from the academic community 
were initially less sympathetic; and more 
critical. Holweg and Pil (2004, 194), for 
example, directly challenged the idea as 
presented in Wells and Nieuwenhuis 
(2000). Recent academic work tends to be 
more positive towards the feasibility of 
distributed manufacturing models, at least 
in the longer term. Holmström et al. 
(2016), for example, recognise the 
inevitable outcome of developments such 
as additive manufacturing on future 
manufacturing models.   
There are other socio-economic industrial 
evolutions such as other more 
decentralising trends in the economy. 
Distributed electricity generation through 
small dispersed wind farms, solar panels 
on house roofs, as well as trends towards 
smaller manufacturing units in a range of 
industries including tyres, steel and 
brewing are all examples (Wells, 2013). In 
this respect, then, although Holmström et 
al. (2016) present their paper as merely 
setting a future research agenda in this 
area, the MFR concept appears to be 
gaining increasing credibility even in 
academia. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, in any future sustainable 
automotive ecosystem, therefore, we 
would envisage a version of micro factory 
retailing as being one of the dominant 
business models for the supply and use of 
motorised personal mobility. 
MFR is based on networks of small 
dispersed, combined assembly, retail and 
aftercare or lifetime management (e.g. 
maintenance and repair, parts supply, 
upgrade, vehicle management and 
takeback) facilities that could operate car 
use under a product-service system (PSS) 
whereby ownership is retained by the 
company and users pay for their use.  
This business model would supply local 
markets, sourcing from local suppliers, 
while being rooted in local economies and 
in tune with local needs. MFRs would also 
source standardised modules globally from 
larger, more centralised facilities that 
would be able to achieve economies of 
scale in modules such as powertrains, for 
example. This process could entail some 
transport over longer distances, although 
this would involve smaller subassemblies 
and modules, rather than complete cars. In 
fact, it could easily be applied not just to 
private cars, but also to more dedicated 
shared car-club cars (e.g. Autolib’s 
Bluecar), dedicated taxis, or public 
transport modes such as buses, or 
commercial vans for local conditions.  
The cost of transport and supply chain 
complexity for shared mass produced 
components and subassemblies would 
have to be offset by the advantages of 
economies of scale. It is conceivable for 
some of the mass car manufacturers in the 
current mass production industry to 
become module suppliers in such an 
alternative model. It is even conceivable 
that some of these mass producers 
become MFRs themselves, or spin off 
existing MFR-like operations to become 
their core activities, although the precise 
nature of the product would have to 
change as well to more environmentally 
optimized vehicles (Nieuwenhuis and 
Wells, 1997, chapter 7).  
Also in a PSS the actual cost of the product 
is less important, as this can be recovered 
over several leases over many years – 
durability and upgradability become key 
criteria – the need for a ‘cheap’ car is 
therefore much reduced, making 
expensive new technologies more viable, 
as is suggested by the Riversimple business 
model (Riversimple, 2017). 
One of MFR’s main distinguishing features 
in relation to the current mass production 
system is that it would break through the 
‘monoculture’ of large centralised 
factories making a standardised, relatively 
undifferentiated product in very large 
numbers and at relatively low cost. Low 
cost and manufacturing-push make these 
cars effectively disposable, with short 
useful life-spans of only 10-15 years. These 
large facilities draw on global supply 
networks and supply global markets. They 
may be compared with the farms of the 
wheat-belt of the US and Canadian prairies 
in that they too are monoculture-based, 
supply world markets with cheap 
standardised grain and draw in supplies – 
in the form of oil based pesticides, 
herbicides and fertilisers – along global 
supply lines. This model too is now 
considered by an increasing number of 
observers to be ultimately unsustainable 
(Benyus, 1997; Diamond, 2005). Jeffries 
(1997, 5) gives the example of the 
monoculture of potatoes in Ireland in the 
1840s and the resulting famine as an 
example of the negative consequences of 
such an approach in agriculture. 
The change process from mass production 
to MFR is difficult to predict, however, as 
system change may happen suddenly after 
a long period of apparent stability (Walker 
and salt, 2006; Perrings 1998). It is also 
important to note that as the existing 
system becomes less able to fulfil the 
needs of the market or the economy in the 
broadest sense, change becomes 
inevitable.  
As Perrings (1998, 506) observes: ‘The 
economic value of a system in some state 
depends on its ability to maintain the flow 
of goods and services for which it is valued 
given the shocks or disturbances it faces. 
The source of disturbances may be either 
anthropogenic or “natural”’.  
In our context we could see these 
disturbances as being generated by the 
dual forces of market pressure and the 
need for greater sustainability. Peterson 
(2000) discusses a model for ecosystem 
change first proposed by Holling (1986) 
and developed further by Gunderson et al. 
(1995). Their cycle moves through rapid 
growth, conservation, collapse and 
reorganisation. In the stable phase – the 
Ford-Budd automotive system during the 
1950s and 1960s for example – the system 
becomes increasingly dependent on the 
persistence of its existing structure. This 
makes it vulnerable to anything that might 
upset it by releasing its organised capital. 
This kind of system is increasingly stable, 
but, Peterson (2000) argues, over a 
decreasing range of conditions and this 
therefore reduces the resilience of the 
system. In this respect, then, as the current 
system has largely favoured efficiency over 
resilience (Walker and Salt 2006) it may 
ultimately not need a massive shock to 
prompt its transition to an alternative 
system. The latter may well involve the 
MFR business model in view of its greater 
inherent sustainability in social, 
environmental, but also ultimately in 
economic terms. 
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